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SUMMARY
The Farm Service Agency guaranteed loan program is an important source of credit for family-sized farming
operations in Arkansas and the other states of the U.S.  This program provides loan guarantees to borrowers who are
otherwise unable to obtain credit from traditional lenders at reasonable rates and terms.  This study identifies those
factors related to the program’s loss claim rate performance over the years fiscal 1989 through 1998 using state-level
data from forty states. For both the operating loan and farm ownership loan programs, farm operator financial vari-
ables, interest rates, and commercial bank characteristics are found to be statistically significant variables in explaining
loss claim rate variation.
Key Words:  Farm Service Agency, guaranteed loans, loss rates, farm loans.
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MODELS OF FARM SERVICE AGENCY
GUARANTEED LOAN LOSS CLAIM
RATES IN THE U.S. FOR 1990-1998
Latisha A. Settlage, Bruce L. Dixon, Bruce L. Ahrendsen
and Steven R. Koenig
INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Farm Service Agency
(FSA) remains an important source of funds for production ag-
riculture, accounting for about 10 percent of total U.S. farm
debt through its direct and guaranteed lending programs.  The
agency’s farm credit mission is to assist family farms unable to
obtain credit from conventional sources at reasonable rates and
terms, but that still possess the potential to establish financially
viable family-sized farming operations.  FSA credit programs
are intended to serve as temporary sources of credit, so there
are limits to the time and amounts an applicant can borrow from
the programs.  Additionally, the programs are targeted to socially
disadvantaged (SDA) family farmers and beginning farmers.1
Until the mid-1980s, the majority of FSA farm loan assis-
tance was provided through its direct loan programs (Figure 1).
Over the last 15 years, there has been a definite policy commit-
ment to shift much of the assistance from the public sector to
the private sector through the use of loan guarantees.  The guar-
anteed loan program enables participating lenders to originate
and service loans otherwise deemed too risky.  Borrowers ben-
efit from loan guarantees because they are able to access credit
at more reasonable terms and interest rates than they would oth-
erwise be able to obtain.
Under a loan guarantee, FSA covers up to 90 percent of the
losses sustained if the loan defaults (95 percent for beginning
farmer loans and loans refinancing certain direct FSA loans).
Guaranteed loans are funded and serviced by participating lend-
ers and made at terms set by the lender, but within the require-
ments of the loan guarantee programs.  Rates charged on guar-
anteed loans must not exceed the lender’s typical farm loan rate,
and borrowers receiving an FSA guarantee must be able to show
ability to repay the loan.  A 1 percent guarantee fee is charged
by FSA on the amount guaranteed.
FSA guarantees farm ownership (FO) and operating loans
(OL).  Loans eligible for an FO guarantee are those used to
purchase farmland, construct or repair farm structures, develop
farmland to promote soil and water conservation, and refinance
existing indebtedness.  Loans eligible for an OL guarantee are
for a variety of purposes, including the purchase of livestock,
machinery, annual operating expenses, and the refinancing of
existing debt under certain conditions.  Interest rate assistance
is available on guaranteed OL loans.  FSA reduces loan rates by
four percentage points if the borrower is unable to repay the
loan at the lender’s normal farm lending rate.
Guaranteed loan program indebtedness per borrower was
capped at $300,000 for the FO program and $400,000 for the
OL program until the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency
Supplemental Appropriation Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-277) was
passed.  The legislation increased the cap to $700,000 for each
program, but kept a total indebtedness cap of $700,000.  The
cap is now adjusted annually by “USDA’s Prices Paid by Farm-
ers Index” to reflect changes in the cost of production.   Limit-
ing borrowing is one way to ensure the programs serve family-
sized farms.  Additional guidelines developed by FSA require
that an applicant’s farming operation be comparable in size to
similar operations in the area, the farm family provides a sub-
stantial share of the full-time labor, and the borrower be re-
sponsible for day-to-day decision making.
Suppliers of Guaranteed Loans
The principal users of FSA loan guarantees are commer-
cial banks and the associations of the Farm Credit System (FCS).
Commercial banks account for approximately 80 percent of the
dollar volume (Koenig and Dodson).  A number of factors in-
fluence a lender’s decision to seek a federal loan guarantee.
The primary reason lenders use loan guarantees is to cover credit
risks on borrowers who fail to meet conventional credit stan-
dards.  Therefore, the volume of farm loans guaranteed annually
is very dependent on the financial health of farm borrowers.
Because a government guarantee reduces the amount re-
quired to capitalize a loan, commercial banks can use Federal
loan guarantees to obtain greater leverage, thus increasing re-
turns-to-equity while controlling risk.  Likewise, banks facing
liquidity constraints can increase their lending resources by
obtaining federal loan guarantees on their farm loans.  Again,
less capital is required to support a guaranteed loan and the
guaranteed portion can be readily sold if necessary.  Small banks
with limited deposit bases and growing loan demand may have
the greatest incentive to seek guarantees, especially on mar-
ginal borrowers.
Very small FCS associations and banks are most likely to
be concerned about lending risk associated with loans to a single
1 An SDA farmer is one who may have been subject to racial, ethnic, or gender prejudices because of his/her identity as a member of a group without regard to his/
her individual qualities. A beginning farmer is one with 10 years or less experience owning or operating a farm.
Fig. 1. Proportional FSA Lending
Source: Economic Research Service, Agricultural Income and Finance,
Situation and Outlook, AIS 73 (February 2000).
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borrower, and federal guarantees allow such banks to better
control that risk.  Federally guaranteed loans are exempt from
rules restricting the amount a bank can lend to a single bor-
rower.   FCS lenders have an incentive to use FSA guaranteed
loan programs when serving FSA eligible applicants because
they can make these loans at a higher loan-to-value ratio.  FCS
lenders can make farm real estate loans equal to 97 percent of
the appraised value if the loan is guaranteed, but are limited to
85 percent of the appraised value if it is not guaranteed.
Banks and FCS lenders also have an incentive to utilize
Federal guarantees to improve credit availability to under served
areas and groups.  Banks have incentives under the Community
Reinvestment Act of 1977, and FCS associations have incen-
tives under Section 4.19 of the Farm Credit Act of 1971, which
requires the FCS to target its lending to young, beginning, and
small farmers through special lending programs.
Overview of Study
This study investigates the loss claim aspect of the FSA
guaranteed loan program in the U.S.  The payment of a loss
claim by FSA is the final step in settling a delinquent loan ac-
count with a guaranteed lender.  When the borrower’s financial
situation no longer allows the timely payment of principal and
interest on an FSA guaranteed loan, the loan becomes delin-
quent.  Generally, some effort is made by FSA and the lender to
help the borrower resume payment on the loan by restructuring
the terms or conditions of the loan.
Debt restructuring can include reamortizing loan payments,
reducing loan interest rates and even forgiving repayment on
some debt.  In situations where debt restructuring cannot rem-
edy a borrower’s ability to meet future debt obligations and
continue farming operations, the lender may determine that the
only alternative remaining to collect on the loan is foreclosure.
The collateral is sold, and the proceeds are disbursed to the
lender.  If the net proceeds from the sale are not sufficient to
cover the full amount of the principal due on the loan, FSA
pays the lender the guaranteed percentage of the lost principal
and a portion of unpaid interest.  This payment is termed a loss
claim.  Loss claims can also be paid on debt write-downs, i.e.,
debt that is forgiven.
Loss claim payments to guaranteed loans for the U.S. have
fluctuated since fiscal 1989.  For the 1989-98 period, guaran-
teed loss claims for the U.S. were at their lowest in fiscal 1995
at $32.3 million and have been trending upward since (Table
1).  Loss claim rates are defined as total loss claim payments as
of the end of the fiscal year divided by total principal outstand-
ing at the beginning of the year.  The loss claim rates for the
U.S. for both FO and OL loans are presented in Figure 2.  The
loss rate for FO loans shows a downward trend throughout the
1990s increasing only slightly in fiscal 1997 and 1998.  The
loss rate for OL loans is higher than the FO loss rate and has
varied more over time.  The lowest OL loss rates were observed
in fiscal 1995 and 1996, while the highest rates occurred most
recently in fiscal 1997 and 1998.
The financial situation of farm operators, general economic
factors, and program rules have likely influenced the rate of
loss claims over the past ten-year period.  When farm operators
experience financial stress, they may find repaying outstanding
debt difficult during periods of decreased profitability.  The
number of defaulted loans and thus, loss claims, are likely to
increase.  This study explores the impact of variables such as
net farm income and government payments, etc. on the varia-
tion in loss claim rates.
Although loss claim rates would be expected to rise in years
Table 1.  Guaranteed Loss Claims Paid for the U.S.*, Fiscal Years 1989-1999
Fiscal Year FO Loans OL Loans Total Guaranteed
(Million $ - Nominal)
1989 9.6 29.6 39.2
1990 5.7 29.9 35.6
1991 7.0 33.6 40.6
1992 7.3 37.4 44.7
1993 8.7 41.1 49.8
1994 8.1 35.7 43.8
1995 5.9 26.4 32.3
1996 5.4 33.2 38.6
1997 6.3 51.5 57.8
1998 7.0 48.0 55.0
1999 9.7 58.1 67.8
Total since Fiscal 1989 80.7 424.5 505.2
* U.S. totals do not include loss claims paid to Alaska, Hawaii or U.S. territories.
Source: Computed from data provided by the Farm Service Agency, Washington, D.C.
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after net farm income falls and vice versa, exactly the opposite
appears to have happened in five of the past nine years for OL
rates (Figure 2).  Most dramatically, in 1996, net farm income
for the U.S. reached a decade high of $54.9 billion.  This is the
calendar year immediately preceding fiscal 1997, a year when
U.S. loss claim rates for FO and OL loans rose.  In addition, it
seems probable that government payments to farmers should
reduce loss claim rates by subsidizing net farm income in peri-
ods of low profits.  Interestingly, loss claim rates have increased
since the enactment of the 1996 FAIR Act, despite record levels
of direct payments to farmers.  In fiscal 1998 and 1999 farmers
received an estimated $35 billion in direct government payments.
The present study investigates these relationships more closely.
Study Objectives
This study investigates the FSA guaranteed loan program
over the past decade and identifies farm operator, farm economy,
agricultural policy, commercial bank, and guaranteed loan pro-
gram variables most important in explaining the variation in
the ratio of loss claim payments to guaranteed principal out-
standing.  Factors such as debt-to-asset ratios, net farm income,
farm size, government payments, interest rates, interest rate
assistance, and loan-to-asset ratios are among those hypothesized
to be important.  This study estimates how these factors influ-
ence the loss claim rates for both FO and OL loans.
For the past fifteen years one key reason that guaranteed
loans have been favored by policymakers relative to direct loans
is the fact that they are less costly to administer and deliver.  A
major factor in the lower costs for guaranteed loan programs is
the much lower loss rate experience on these loans relative to
direct loans.  Therefore, less budget authority is required to sup-
port a given amount of annual lending or obligation authority
as the use of guarantees increases.
The amount of lending that a given level of budget author-
ity will support is determined by the budget subsidy rate, or the
government’s cost of lending $1 under a loan program.  For
example, a budget authority of one dollar will support $20 of
obligation authority at a 5 percent subsidy rate, but $100 of
authority at a 1 percent subsidy rate.  In fiscal 1999, the subsidy
rate for the guaranteed FO programs was 1.56 percent while
that of the direct FO program was 14.97 percent.  The level of
interest rate assistance provided, anticipated default costs, re-
payment rates, and certain transaction costs are factors that de-
termine the subsidy rate for a given fiscal year.
If the loan program does not provide a direct interest rate
subsidy such as through the interest rate assistance program for
loan guarantees, then the anticipated loss claim rate is the pri-
mary factor affecting the subsidy rate.  Therefore, the amount
of loss claim anticipated on loans during a fiscal year has a
large effect on the program subsidy rate and hence on the amount
of money Congress must appropriate to support a desired level
of future lending activity.
The results of this study will aid policymakers and pro-
gram administrators in forecasting or estimating loss claim rates
of the guaranteed loan programs.  The study also provides in-
sight on the factors that determine annual subsidy costs for the
loan guarantee programs.
FSA GUARANTEED LOAN PROGRAM ACTIVITY
Between fiscal 1983 and 1995, loan guarantees rose from
2.3 percent of total FSA annual obligations to a high of 77.5
percent of total annual obligations (USDA/ERS, 2000).  This
percentage has decreased somewhat since 1995 and stood at 66
percent in fiscal 1999.  In terms of total dollars obligated, $1.3
billion in direct loans and $2.6 billion in guaranteed loans were
obligated in fiscal 1999 (Figure 3).  This was the highest level
of lending during the 1990s, as Congress boosted lending au-
thority to assist an ailing farm economy.
The use of loan guarantees is centered in the middle por-
tion of the U.S. with limited use in the western and eastern parts
of the country (Figure 4).  For fiscal years 1989 through 1998,
the Corn Belt region has the highest mean FO obligation with
$83.6 million.2  Other regions having high mean FO obliga-
2  Prior to fiscal 1999, the USDA classified the 48 contiguous states into ten regions based on homogeneity of resource base and agricultural production.  These ten
regions and the states that comprise each are listed in Table 5.  The new regional classifications cut across state lines.  However, since the data examined in the
study are aggregated at the state level, only the prior regional classifications are used.
* Loss claim rates are computed as the sum of losses in the 48 states divided by
the sum of principal for the U.S., not the mean of the 48 rates for a given year.
Sources: Loss claim rates are computed from data provided by the Farm Ser-
vice Agency, Washington, D.C., and net farm income figures are from the Eco-















1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Year
Farm Income FO Loans OL Loans
Fig. 2. Net Farm Income and FSA Loss Claim Rates
for the U.S., 1989-1998
Fig. 2. Net Farm Income and FSA Loss Claim Rates*
for the U.S., 989-1998
Fig. 3. Annual FSA Lending
 Source: Farm Service Agency Report 205.
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Fig. 4. Farmers with FSA Guarantees as of October 1999, by County
Fig. 5. Cumulative Losses Paid Out From Guaranteed Loan Program Since 1989
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tions for the same ten-year period include the Lake States ($64.6
million), Northern Plains ($59.4 million), Appalachia ($47.4
million) and Delta ($42.2 million).  The Corn Belt region also
has the highest mean OL obligation with $188.8 million, fol-
lowed by the Southern Plains ($154.5 million), Lake States
($144.7 million), Delta ($144.7 million), and Mountain ($78.2
million) regions.
Guaranteed loss claims in the U.S. have varied substan-
tially over the past decade ranging from a low of $32.3 million
in fiscal 1995 to a high of $67.8 million in fiscal 1999 (Table
1).  In fiscal 1999, only $9.7 million (14.3 percent) of total loss
claims were paid on FO loans, while $58.1 million (85.7 per-
cent) were paid on OL loans.  Like obligation levels, loss claim
activity is centered in the middle portion of the U.S. (Figure 5).
The Lake States region has the highest FO mean of $1.6 mil-
lion for the period fiscal 1989-98, while the Southern Plains
region has the highest OL mean of $9.2 million.  Other regions
having high FO means include the Delta ($1.2 million) and
Southern Plains ($1 million) regions, while other regions hav-
ing high OL means include the Delta ($8.3 million) and Lake
States ($4.7 million) regions.
Since this study identifies those factors which influence
the variability in guaranteed loss claim rates over time and
among states, it is useful to highlight the regional and state varia-
tion in FO and OL loss claim rates over time.  The mean FO
loss rates for each USDA production region for fiscal years,
1990 through 1998 are shown in Figure 6.  Table 2 provides the
actual numerical values that correspond to the figures as well
as the annual rates.
There is a wide disparity in the loss claim rates both be-
tween various regions and within certain regions over time.  The
loss claim rate for the Southern Plains region consistently ranks
in the top five loss rates for all nine years.  Other regions hav-
ing high loss claim rates include the Lake States, Mountain,
Delta and Northeast regions.
Figure 7 illustrates the mean OL loss claim rates for each
production region in the U.S. over the fiscal 1990-1998 time
frame.  The numeric means and annual rates are found in Table
2. The OL loss claim rates are not as dispersed as the FO loss
claim rates.  One region, the Delta, has the highest loss claim
rate for all years in the period.  The Southern Plains and South-
east regions also have high loss rates.
Summarizing the regional variation in loss claim rates, the
Southern Plains region consistently has high rates for the sample
period for both FO and OL loans.  While the Northeast region
shows high loss rates for FO loans, especially in recent years,
its loss rate for OL loans is lower than other regions.  The Delta
region has the highest OL loss rates, while both the Northern
Plains and Corn Belt regions have low FO and OL loss rates.
Table 3 displays the FO loss rates for each year of the study
for each of the 48 contiguous states.  The mean loss rates for
each state over the sample period are also included.  There are
five states with mean FO loss claim rates for the sample period
of 1 percent or greater.  These are Arizona (3.3 percent), Con-
necticut (2.3 percent), New Hampshire (1.3 percent), Louisi-
ana (1.2 percent) and Florida (1.0 percent).  Twelve states have
a mean FO loss claim rate between 0.5 and 1 percent, and the
remaining 31 states have mean rates less than 0.5 percent.  The
states with the lowest five mean loss claim rates are Nebraska,
Virginia, North Carolina, Delaware and Nevada.
The annual and mean OL loss rates for each of the 48 states
for fiscal 1990 through 1998 are listed in Table 4.  Twenty-four
states have mean OL loss claim rates of 1 percent or greater.
The ten highest rates are those of Louisiana (3.8 percent), Con-
necticut (3.6 percent), Mississippi (3.3 percent), Oklahoma (2.7
percent), New Mexico (2.6 percent), Oregon (2.4 percent), Ten-
nessee (2.2 percent), Arkansas (2.1 percent), Texas (2.0 per-
cent) and West Virginia (1.9 percent).  Seventeen states have
rates between 0.5 and 1 percent, while only seven states have
mean rates less than 0.5 percent.  The five states with the lowest
OL loss claim rates include Vermont, Nebraska, Nevada, Rhode
Island and Delaware.
Four states rank in the top ten highest mean loss rates for
both FO and OL loans.  Connecticut’s high rank for both types
of loans is somewhat insignificant given that it is one of the
eight states making the lowest dollar volume of guaranteed ob-
ligations.  If a state makes a relatively low volume of loans, a
Source:  Computed from data provided by the Farm Service Agency,
Washington, D.C.
Fig. 6. Regional FO Loss Claim Rates
Mean Rates for 1990-1998
Fig. 7. Regional OL Loss Claim Rates
Mean Rates for 1990-1998
Source:  Computed from data provided by the Farm Service Agency,
Washington, D.C.
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Table 2.  Loss Claim Rates by Region, Fiscal 1990-1998
1990 1991 1992 1993
Region FO OL FO OL FO OL FO OL
Pacific 0.002 0.008 0.023 0.007 0.000 0.008 0.001 0.014
Mountain 0.009 0.014 0.006 0.013 0.016 0.016 0.006 0.014
No. Plains 0.004 0.008 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.005 0.001 0.006
So. Plains 0.015 0.020 0.009 0.017 0.008 0.019 0.010 0.026
Lake States 0.021 0.012 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.013 0.003 0.008
Corn Belt 0.006 0.008 0.003 0.006 0.002 0.006 0.002 0.008
Delta States 0.002 0.070 0.007 0.082 0.008 0.061 0.014 0.046
Northeast 0.001 0.006 0.006 0.008 0.000 0.005 0.013 0.008
Appalachia 0.004 0.016 0.004 0.017 0.001 0.016 0.003 0.013
Southeast 0.001 0.009 0.004 0.025 0.005 0.013 0.004 0.012
1994 1995 1996 1997
Region FO OL FO OL FO OL FO OL
Pacific 0.000 0.005 0.002 0.013 0.002 0.009 0.002 0.007
Mountain 0.005 0.012 0.001 0.008 0.003 0.007 0.000 0.009
No. Plains 0.001 0.006 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.001 0.004
So. Plains 0.014 0.025 0.005 0.014 0.002 0.017 0.008 0.036
Lake States 0.004 0.007 0.002 0.008 0.002 0.007 0.003 0.011
Corn Belt 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.004
Delta States 0.006 0.041 0.005 0.027 0.004 0.039 0.004 0.058
Northeast 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.008 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.009
Appalachia 0.001 0.014 0.002 0.010 0.001 0.014 0.001 0.012
Southeast 0.009 0.015 0.003 0.011 0.002 0.019 0.002 0.014
1998    Mean*
Region FO OL FO OL
Pacific 0.001 0.015 0.004 0.010
Mountain 0.004 0.017 0.006 0.012
No. Plains 0.001 0.006 0.002 0.005
So. Plains 0.003 0.027 0.008 0.022
Lake States 0.002 0.009 0.006 0.009
Corn Belt 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.006
Delta States 0.004 0.045 0.006 0.052
Northeast 0.008 0.009 0.005 0.007
Appalachia 0.002 0.010 0.002 0.014
Southeast 0.001 0.017 0.004 0.015
* The means are calculated by summing the rates for each region over the 1990-1998 period and dividing by the number of years (9).
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Table 3.  FO Loss Claim Rates by States, 1990-1998
Year Alabama Arizona Arkansas California Colorado Connecticut
1990 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.019 0.057
1991 0.008 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.013 0.000
1992 0.000 0.190 0.006 0.000 0.032 0.000
1993 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.002 0.003 0.153
1994 0.000 0.076 0.003 0.000 0.007 0.000
1995 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000
1996 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.000
1997 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.000
1998 0.000 0.033 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.000
Mean 0.001 0.033 0.003 0.001 0.009 0.023
Year Delaware Florida Georgia Idaho Illinois Indiana
1990 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.024 0.011 0.001
1991 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.016 0.003 0.007
1992 0.000 0.009 0.002 0.015 0.001 0.000
1993 0.000 0.018 0.006 0.007 0.002 0.000
1994 0.000 0.034 0.004 0.000 0.002 0.000
1995 0.000 0.009 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.001
1996 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.014 0.003 0.000
1997 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000
1998 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.000
Mean 0.000 0.010 0.003 0.009 0.003 0.001
Year Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland
1990 0.005 0.000 0.012 0.004 0.000 0.000
1991 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.011 0.000 0.000
1992 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.012 0.000 0.000
1993 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.038 0.000 0.026
1994 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.012 0.000 0.000
1995 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.008 0.062 0.000
1996 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000
1997 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.011 0.002 0.000
1998 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.010 0.000 0.000
Mean 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.012 0.007 0.003
Year Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana
1990 0.000 0.018 0.017 0.004 0.008 0.000
1991 0.000 0.004 0.006 0.009 0.002 0.000
1992 0.000 0.011 0.002 0.006 0.002 0.010
1993 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.007 0.004 0.008
1994 0.000 0.003 0.002 0.006 0.002 0.000
1995 0.015 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.000
1996 0.026 0.002 0.001 0.006 0.002 0.004
1997 0.012 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.002
1998 0.016 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.000
Mean 0.008 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.002 0.003
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Table 3.  FO Loss Claim Rates by States, 1990-1998 (continued)
Year Nebraska Nevada New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York
1990 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1991 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1992 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
1993 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.022
1994 0.001 0.000 0.047 0.000 0.015 0.002
1995 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.005
1996 0.000 0.000 0.054 0.000 0.000 0.003
1997 0.001 0.000 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.005
1998 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.004 0.010
Mean 0.001 0.000 0.013 0.003 0.004 0.005
Year North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania
1990 0.000 0.017 0.001 0.021 0.008 0.000
1991 0.000 0.004 0.008 0.011 0.024 0.016
1992 0.000 0.007 0.012 0.006 0.000 0.000
1993 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.009
1994 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.004
1995 0.000 0.006 0.001 0.002 0.012 0.002
1996 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000
1997 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.001
1998 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.005 0.000
Mean 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.008 0.005 0.004
Year Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah
1990 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.001 0.000 0.000
1991 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.023 0.005 0.000
1992 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.000
1993 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.015 0.000
1994 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.003
1995 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.008 0.009 0.005
1996 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.003 0.003
1997 0.028 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.008 0.000
1998 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.006
Mean 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.005 0.008 0.002
Year Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming
1990 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.026 0.000
1991 0.004 0.000 0.034 0.000 0.008 0.000
1992 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.010 0.025
1993 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.003 0.002
1994 0.006 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.005 0.002
1995 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.003 0.002 0.000
1996 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000
1997 0.005 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.006 0.000
1998 0.021 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.002 0.007
Mean 0.005 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.007 0.004
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Table 4.  OL Loss Claim Rates by States, 1990-1998
Year Alabama Arizona Arkansas California Colorado Connecticut
1990 0.006 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.008 0.236
1991 0.016 0.000 0.015 0.004 0.032 0.000
1992 0.000 0.000 0.032 0.005 0.022 0.000
1993 0.025 0.000 0.047 0.008 0.010 0.046
1994 0.004 0.090 0.030 0.004 0.009 0.000
1995 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.005 0.015 0.039
1996 0.012 0.000 0.012 0.008 0.010 0.000
1997 0.004 0.000 0.014 0.007 0.009 0.000
1998 0.003 0.011 0.014 0.021 0.012 0.000
Mean 0.008 0.011 0.021 0.007 0.014 0.036
Year Delaware Florida Georgia Idaho Illinois Indiana
1990 0.000 0.013 0.012 0.016 0.010 0.006
1991 0.000 0.026 0.019 0.002 0.007 0.025
1992 0.000 0.019 0.013 0.006 0.008 0.012
1993 0.000 0.007 0.009 0.016 0.009 0.002
1994 0.000 0.019 0.011 0.004 0.002 0.009
1995 0.000 0.005 0.014 0.009 0.005 0.006
1996 0.000 0.022 0.018 0.006 0.006 0.004
1997 0.000 0.004 0.017 0.015 0.001 0.005
1998 0.000 0.023 0.018 0.032 0.004 0.001
Mean 0.000 0.015 0.015 0.012 0.006 0.008
Year Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland
1990 0.009 0.009 0.012 0.034 0.004 0.019
1991 0.005 0.005 0.015 0.057 0.000 0.005
1992 0.004 0.005 0.014 0.040 0.000 0.003
1993 0.007 0.008 0.022 0.030 0.000 0.053
1994 0.005 0.009 0.014 0.032 0.012 0.017
1995 0.003 0.006 0.016 0.020 0.000 0.007
1996 0.003 0.004 0.007 0.038 0.000 0.003
1997 0.005 0.003 0.019 0.041 0.012 0.002
1998 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.052 0.117 0.007
Mean 0.005 0.006 0.014 0.038 0.016 0.013
Year Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana
1990 0.000 0.020 0.012 0.017 0.005 0.013
1991 0.000 0.012 0.009 0.024 0.002 0.013
1992 0.021 0.021 0.011 0.017 0.005 0.025
1993 0.000 0.013 0.006 0.026 0.017 0.007
1994 0.000 0.004 0.010 0.047 0.009 0.011
1995 0.007 0.010 0.009 0.031 0.003 0.005
1996 0.037 0.004 0.008 0.024 0.006 0.000
1997 0.018 0.005 0.010 0.065 0.006 0.007
1998 0.000 0.005 0.007 0.050 0.013 0.015
Mean 0.009 0.011 0.009 0.033 0.007 0.011
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Table 4.  OL Loss Claim Rates by States, 1990-1998 (continued)
Year Nebraska Nevada New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York
1990 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.029 0.002
1991 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.040 0.006
1992 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.042 0.004
1993 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.054 0.000
1994 0.004 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.044 0.007
1995 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.014 0.005 0.008
1996 0.003 0.000 0.020 0.022 0.003 0.001
1997 0.003 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.001 0.013
1998 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.015 0.004
Mean 0.003 0.000 0.006 0.005 0.026 0.005
Year North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania
1990 0.003 0.041 0.003 0.032 0.049 0.000
1991 0.017 0.008 0.007 0.022 0.018 0.034
1992 0.011 0.013 0.016 0.013 0.019 0.004
1993 0.007 0.012 0.008 0.029 0.015 0.017
1994 0.007 0.012 0.004 0.032 0.004 0.002
1995 0.002 0.006 0.002 0.020 0.053 0.010
1996 0.002 0.006 0.015 0.037 0.028 0.003
1997 0.012 0.007 0.001 0.039 0.002 0.014
1998 0.014 0.012 0.003 0.020 0.025 0.002
Mean 0.008 0.013 0.006 0.027 0.024 0.010
Year Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah
1990 0.000 0.003 0.004 0.041 0.009 0.008
1991 0.000 0.051 0.004 0.024 0.014 0.000
1992 0.000 0.019 0.003 0.030 0.023 0.001
1993 0.000 0.016 0.004 0.008 0.024 0.014
1994 0.000 0.027 0.004 0.025 0.022 0.012
1995 0.000 0.011 0.002 0.013 0.011 0.000
1996 0.000 0.019 0.004 0.032 0.008 0.005
1997 0.000 0.016 0.002 0.015 0.035 0.004
1998 0.000 0.009 0.007 0.012 0.030 0.003
Mean 0.000 0.019 0.004 0.022 0.020 0.005
Year Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming
1990 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.018 0.007 0.010
1991 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.062 0.007 0.006
1992 0.010 0.000 0.005 0.025 0.010 0.009
1993 0.002 0.001 0.019 0.023 0.007 0.011
1994 0.003 0.010 0.007 0.004 0.006 0.005
1995 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.010 0.005 0.007
1996 0.001 0.014 0.004 0.017 0.008 0.014
1997 0.001 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.015 0.018
1998 0.015 0.000 0.003 0.015 0.012 0.022
Mean 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.019 0.009 0.011
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large loss in a given year can highly skew the mean rate.  By
looking more closely at the yearly rates for the state, it is appar-
ent that two very high annual FO loss rates and three OL rates
have spiked the mean given all of the other annual rates are
zeros for the state.  Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas rank in the
top ten for both types of loans.  All three states in the Delta
region—Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi—have three of
the ten highest mean OL loss rates for the study period.  The
Southern Plains and Delta regions grow significant amounts of
cotton and rice–two crops receiving considerable government
payments.
Given the descriptive analysis of the data, it is likely that
there are underlying factors that determine the variation in loss
claim rates across states over time.  The remainder of the study
focuses on identifying what those factors are and testing their
statistical significance.  After the FO and OL models are devel-
oped, the out-of-sample observations of the data are used to
predict the loss claim rates for fiscal 1998.  These predictions
are compared to the actual fiscal 1998 figures to determine the
precision of the model.  The study is concluded by interpreting
the model results and discussing policy implications.
METHODOLOGY
Types of Regression Models Estimated
Loss claim rates are hypothesized to be a function of sev-
eral variables that measure:  (1) the financial well-being of farm
operators; (2) the structure of the agricultural industry; (3) the
overall strength of the agricultural sector and economic poli-
cies toward agriculture; (4) the agricultural lending policies of
commercial banks; and (5) the level of activity in the various
dimensions of the guaranteed loan program.  All the variables
represent underlying sources of risk either present at the time
of origination or evolving from circumstances arising during
the life of loans that may result in loans becoming unsuccessful.
For each of the variables included in the regression mod-
els, data are observed by state across years.  Thus, the data are
an annual time series of cross sections (panel) in nature.   Since
there are two major guaranteed loan programs with distinctly
different purposes, two separate regression models are estimated.
The two models do not include exactly the same variables since
some variables are important in explaining FO loss claim rates
but not OL loss claim rates and vice versa.  Additionally, since
the two types of loans are different in terms of time structure
(FO loans are long-term loans and OL loans are short to me-
dium-term loans), we expect that some of the signs on variables
common to both models will differ.
Upon examination of FO and OL volumes across states,
eight of the 48 states in the sample are eliminated due to low
levels of guaranteed lending activity.  The eight states deleted
from the sample are mostly in the Northeast region and include
Rhode Island, New Hampshire, Delaware, Connecticut, Nevada,
New Jersey, Maine and Arizona.  These eight states average
less than $3 million in annual total guaranteed obligations dur-
ing the 1989 through 1998 fiscal years.  The state with the low-
est decade average deleted from the sample was Rhode Island
with an annual average of $417,589, while the state with the
lowest decade obligation average included in the sample is
Massachusetts at $5,402,300.
A substantial literature exists on the proper estimation of a
model using panel data, and a summary may be found in Judge
et al.  Under very restrictive assumptions the components of the
estimated coefficient vector could be estimated by ordinary least
squares (OLS).  Using OLS implies that the error term variance
does not vary across time and cross-sectional unit and that the
estimated coefficient vector is constant across time and cross-
sectional unit.  OLS also assumes no serial or contemporane-
ous correlation across time or states.  These assumptions are
quite restrictive.
In order to relax the assumption that the error term vari-
ance does not vary across time or cross-sectional unit,  the OL
loan model is specified and estimated using a time series/cross
section (TSCS) model which utilizes a feasible generalized least
squares estimator (FGLS).  FGLS is used instead of general-
ized least squares because the parameter values of the error term
covariance matrix are unknown.  The model assumes that the
error term variances do not change within a state but that the
errors may vary across states.  FGLS provides asymptotically
efficient estimates of the coefficients and standard errors under
these assumptions. The coefficient vector is assumed to be con-
stant over time except for the intercept.  State binary variables
are included to allow the intercept to vary by state.  This model
is commonly referred to as a fixed effects model.
An alternative specification, if the coefficient vector is
thought to be unequal across states, would be seemingly unre-
lated regression (SUR) model.  However, for the particular ap-
plication in this study, a SUR model is not estimated because
the number of cross-sectional units (40) greatly exceeds the
number of years of annual observations (eight).  Thus, the em-
pirical estimate of the error term covariance matrix would be
singular.
A concern in the FO model with the particular sample is
that a large proportion of the observations on the dependent
variable are zeros.  This violates an assumption of the OLS
model.  The FO regression model is estimated using a Tobit
framework in order to account for the large proportion of zero
observations.  Fixed effects are employed in the Tobit model by
using binary variables to designate production regions.3  To ac-
commodate variation in error variances across regions, the
Harvey multiplicative model discussed in Greene (1998) is used.
Variables Hypothesized to Affect FSA Loss Claim Rates
Since there are many independent variables included in the
models for this study, it is important to discuss the theorized
relationships of those variables to the dependent variables.   All
the variables used in the study as well as the units each are
measured in are defined in Table 5.  Their construction is dis-
3  Although using the state binary variables for the fixed effects in the FO model as opposed to production region binary variables would have been preferred, the
statistical software used to estimate the Tobit model was unable to converge given the large number of independent variables.
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Table 5.  Definitions and Expected Signs of Dependent and Independent Variables*
Variable Definition Expected Sign
Dependent Variables:
FONLC Loss claims paid on FO loans divided by beginning of the year FO
principal outstanding (ratio).
OLNLC Loss claims paid on OL loans divided by beginning of the year OL
principal outstanding (ratio).
Independent Variables:
Group 1: Financial Variables
DAR Debt-to-asset ratio. +
NFI Net farm income divided by number of farm operations (million $). -
ROA Rate of return on assets from current farm income (ratio). -
DEBTSVC Debt servicing ratio. +
Group 2: Structural Variables
CREV Proportion of State farm revenues generated by crop sales. +
SIZE Land in farms with annual sales greater than $10,000 divided by +/-
number of farm operations with annual sales greater than $10,000
(thousands of acres).
WORK Proportion of farm operators in the state (with sales greater than +/-
$10,000) working more than 200 days off the farm.
Group 3: Economic Environment Variables
LTINT Interest rate charged by commercial banks on long-term farm real estate +
loans (% divided by 100).
STINT Interest rate charged by commercial banks on short-term non-real estate +
farm loans (% divided by 100).
GOV Direct government payments per farm operation (million $). +/-
Group 4: Commercial Bank Variables
AGTL Ratio of agricultural loans made by commercial banks to total loans +/-
made by commercial banks.
AGBNK Number of agricultural banks per farm operation. +/-
LAR Ratio of total loans made by commercial banks to total assets of +
commercial banks.
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Table 5. Definitions and Expected Signs of Dependent and Independent Variables (continued)*
Variable Definition Expected Sign
Group 5: FSA Loan Variables
AVGFO FO principal outstanding divided by number of FO loans outstanding +
(Million $).
AVGOL OL principal outstanding divided by number of OL loans outstanding +
(Million $).
OLIRA OL interest rate assistance vouchered divided by number of OL loans +/-
outstanding ($).
FOGLTL Guaranteed FO principal outstanding divided by total real estate debt +
outstanding.
OLGLTL Guaranteed OL principal outstanding divided by total non-real estate +
debt outstanding.
OLBKPCT Proportion of guaranteed OL obligations made by commercial banks. +/-
Group 6: Regional (and State) Binary Variables
PAC Pacific Region–California (CA), Oregon (OR), Washington (WA).
MTN Mountain Region–Arizona (AZ), Colorado (CO), Idaho (ID),
Montana (MT), Nevada (NV), New Mexico (NM), Utah (UT),
Wyoming (WY).
NOPL Northern Plains Region–Kansas (KS), Nebraska (NE), North Dakota
(ND), South Dakota (SD).
SOPL Southern Plains Region–Oklahoma (OK), Texas (TX).
LAKE Lake States Region–Michigan (MI), Minnesota (MN), Wisconsin (WI).
CORN Corn Belt Region–Illinois (IL), Indiana (IN), Iowa (IA),
Missouri (MO), Ohio (OH).
DELTA Delta States Region–Arkansas (AR), Louisiana (LA), Mississippi (MS).
NER Northeast Region–Connecticut (CT), Delaware (DE), Maine (MN),
Maryland (MD), Massachusetts (MA), New Hampshire (NH),
New Jersey (NJ), New York (NY), Pennsylvania (PA),
Rhode Island (RI), Vermont (VT).
APP Appalachia Region–Kentucky (KY), North Carolina (NC),
Tennessee (TN), Virginia (VA), West Virginia (WV).
SER Southeast Region–Alabama (AL), Florida (FL), Georgia (GA),
South Carolina (SC).
* The subscripts “it” are suppressed for clarity, but each variable is defined for state i and year t.
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Fig. 8. Agricultural Revenue
for the U.S., 1988-1998
4  Since several of the independent variables considered by the study are ratios, the dependent variables, FO and OL loss claims paid, are normalized as proportions
of principal outstanding.  The normalizations are required because the sizes of the agricultural economies vary greatly across states.  Thus, without normalization,
any variables that vary as a function of the size of a state’s agricultural economy would likely explain a majority of the variation in the volume of loss claims across
states.
5  NASS-Farms and Land in Farms: 1988-92 <http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/data-sets/land/95895/sb895.txt> and 1993-97 <http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/usda/
reports/general/sb/b9550199.txt> accessed 1/26/99.
cussed in Fultz except for the modifications noted herein.  The
dependent variable for the FO model is the ratio of annual loss
claims paid on guaranteed FO loans to beginning of the year
principal outstanding on FO loans (FONLC).4  The dependent
variable for the OL model, OLNLC, is analogous to FONLC
except it is defined for OL loss claims and principal outstand-
ing on OL loans.  In both models, it is assumed that beginning
year principal outstanding is known, i.e., predetermined.  Thus,
in interpreting variable signs, we are concerned with how those
variables affect loss claim levels given the existing principal
outstanding.
Farm Firm Financial Variables
Farm operator characteristics measure various aspects of
the financial condition of farm borrowers such as liquidity, sol-
vency and profitability.  The hypothesis is that a strong finan-
cial position promotes timely principal and interest payments
of guaranteed loans.  Thus, with strong financial variables, fewer
borrowers become delinquent, and loss claim ratios decrease.
A farm operation is said to be solvent if the value of the
farm assets is high enough to pay all creditors if the farm’s total
debt obligation became due immediately.  There are a variety
of ways to measure solvency, such as the ratio of debt pledged
against farm business assets to farm assets (DAR).  In 1995,
Dodson and Koenig found that borrowers with FSA guaranteed
bank loans had a weighted debt-to-asset ratio of 0.29 compared
with only about 15 percent for all farm borrowers.  Addition-
ally, in an early 1980s study by Turvey of Canada’s Farm Credit
Corporation, debt-to-asset ratios were found significant in ex-
plaining the probability of a loan being noncurrent.  Since an
increase in the debt-to-asset ratio would indicate a higher level
of financial risk faced by farm operations, this variable is hy-
pothesized to be directly related to loss claim rates.
A farm is profitable if the total amount of revenue gener-
ated exceeds total expenses.  One measure of profitability is the
average net farm income earned by farm operations in the state
(NFI).  In a 1910-1978 study of bankruptcy rates in the U.S.,
Shepard and Collins found bankruptcy rates to be significantly
and inversely related to farm income.  That is, as farm income
increased, bankruptcy rates among farm operators decreased
and vice versa.  Farm businesses that are profitable generally
have fewer difficulties meeting financial obligations in a timely
manner.  In the present study, NFI is expected to be inversely
related to loss claim rates.
The return to farm assets within the state from current
income divided by farm assets within the state (ROA) is a
measure of how efficiently the farm business uses its assets to
generate income.  ROA does not include income realized from
capital gains on assets.  Thus, this ratio provides a pure mea-
sure of the profitability of farm operations in the state.   In the
Turvey study, higher rates of return on farm assets were found
to correspond with lower probabilities of loans being noncur-
rent.  Thus, ROA is hypothesized to be inversely related to loss
claim rates as well.
Cash available to pay debt is clearly an important indicator
of default likelihood.  The debt servicing ratio in a state
(DEBTSVC), computed as the sum of interest and principal
payments divided by gross cash farm income, measures the share
of gross income needed to service debt.  This ratio indicates the
liquidity of farm operations and the ease with which debt obli-
gations can be met from readily available income.  Miller and
LaDue used a similar variable in their 1983 credit scoring mod-
els for dairy farm borrowers.  In their study, lower debt pay-
ments per dollar of milk sales were found to significantly indi-
cate higher borrower loan quality.  Therefore, DEBTSVC is
hypothesized to be directly related to loss claim rates.
Structural Variables
There appears to be a difference in the types of agriculture
that use the two types of guaranteed loans.  Koenig and Sullivan
estimated that only 30 percent of those farm operators using
OL loan guarantees had livestock (including dairy) as their major
farm enterprise versus 54 percent using FO loans. In addition,
during the time period of the study, revenues from the sale of
crops varied much more dramatically than revenues from the
sale of livestock as shown in Figure 8. The variable crop rev-
enue (CREV) is defined as the proportion of gross agricultural
revenue from crops in a state.  A greater concentration of crop
farms in a state increases the likelihood that farm income will
be affected adversely by weather events.  In addition, crop farms
have more borrowed capital for operating expenses, and as such
their credits are less secure.  Therefore, as the share of crop
revenue to total revenue rises, we expect loss rates for loans to
increase.
From 1988 to 1997, the average size of farms in the U.S.
with sales of more than $10,000 rose from 788 to 821 acres.5
Shepard and Collins hypothesized that an increase in farm size
places greater emphasis on machinery, irrigation equipment and
Fig. 8. Agricultural Revenue for the U.S., 1988-1998
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other fixed or quasi-fixed inputs.  In addition, a capital inten-
sive operation requires annual purchases of insecticides, seeds,
fertilizers, feeds or animals to complement the fixed inputs.
Thus, as average farm size increases, financial risk may also
increase.  However, larger farms may be more efficient in all
aspects of farming: production, marketing and financing.  Un-
der this hypothesis, increased farm size may result in less risk.
To capture the potential effect of average farm size on loss claim
rates, the total number of agricultural acres divided by number
of farm operations (SIZE) is defined.  Koenig and Dodson re-
port that most guaranteed loans are made to family-sized farms
and not small, “hobby” farms.6  Therefore, SIZE is calculated
as land in farms with annual sales of greater than $10,000 di-
vided by number of farm operations with annual sales of greater
than $10,000.
In order to reduce a portion of the financial risk associated
with production agriculture, a substantial number of farm op-
erators are employed off the farm.  In 1994, the proportion of
total income for farm operator households derived from off-
farm income was 90 percent.  While this figure decreases when
considering farm operator households with farm sales between
$50,000 and $249,000 (70 percent) and $500,000 or more (23
percent), a major portion of farm operator households receive
at least some off-farm income.7  The importance of off-farm
income to farm operators within a state is measured by the pro-
portion of farm operators in a state working more than 200 days
off the farm (WORK).8   The direction of the relationship be-
tween WORK and loss claim rates cannot be specified with
complete certainty.  While off-farm income provides a risk-re-
ducing supplement to net farm income, a high proportion of
farm operators spending working days off the farm may indi-
cate an absolute need for additional income to avoid financial
problems.
Economic Environment Variables
Characteristics of the general economic environment mea-
sure the overall condition and health of the agricultural economy.
As the interest rates charged on loans increase, borrowers may
find qualifying for credit given their existing repayment capac-
ity more difficult because lenders are less willing to extend
credit.  Low interest rates allow farm operators to acquire credit
to see them through difficult times, preventing or delaying fail-
ure (Shepard and Collins).  To account for this impact, the in-
terest rate charged by commercial banks on long-term farm real
estate loans (LTINT) is included in the FO model, and the inter-
est rate charged by commercial banks on short-term non-real
estate farm loans (STINT) is included in the OL model.   Posi-
tive coefficients are expected for both LTINT and STINT.9
The other farm environment variable is defined as the an-
nual direct government payments paid to farm operators in the
state divided by number of farms (GOV).  Farm policy may
affect loss claim rates by supporting and stabilizing farmer in-
come through direct payments to farmers.  However, substan-
tial payments to farmers might also indicate financial stress
(more government assistance needed to shield farmers from the
full financial effects of natural disasters or unfavorable market
conditions).  Thus, a directional relationship between govern-
ment payments and loss claim rates cannot be determined on
theoretical grounds.
Banking Variables
The commercial bank characteristics considered in this
study measure the importance of agriculture in the loan portfo-
lio and the propensity of banks within a state to make agricul-
tural loans.  Variation in loss claim rates due to changes in lend-
ing behavior to the agricultural sector is captured by the ratio of
agricultural loans-to-total loans made by commercial banks in
the state (AGTL).  The number of agricultural banks per farm
(AGBNK) measures the availability of credit from banks mak-
ing a significant volume of agricultural loans to farm opera-
tions located within the state.10   The ratio of total loans made
by commercial banks in the state to total assets of commercial
banks in the state (LAR) measures lenders’ propensities to in-
vest available funds in loans as opposed to other investments.
Dixon, Ahrendsen and McCollum reported that agricultural
banks are likely to make more FSA guaranteed loans than nona-
gricultural banks and found that increasing loan-to-asset ratios
were associated with greater bank participation in the guaran-
teed farm loan programs.  This increased use of guarantees was
thought to shield lenders with aggressive lending policies from
an otherwise expanded exposure to agricultural loan losses.  That
is, as banks seek to make more loans in a given area, the base of
customers left to extend credit to are marginally less credit
worthy.
Since increases in all three of these commercial bank vari-
ables–AGTL, AGBNK and LAR–are hypothesized to result in
a larger number of guaranteed loans made at a greater risk level,
they are thought to have positive relationships with loss claim
rates in both the FO and OL models.  However, agricultural
lenders may be more sensitive to the potential problems that
arise in production agriculture that adversely affect the finan-
cial performance of their farm borrowers.  These lenders are
probably more likely to make special repayment arrangements
to help their farmers through difficult times.  This would imply
that increases in AGTL and AGBNK would decrease loss
claim rates.  So the sign expectations on these two variables are
ambiguous.
FSA Loan Variables
Characteristics of the guaranteed loan program should be
important determinants of loss claim rate variations.  Principal
6  ERS <http://www.ers.usda.gov/whatsnew/issues/lending/chart1.htm>.
7  ERS <http://www.econ.ag.gov/briefing/fbe/hhold/hh_t0203.htm> accessed 3/16/99.
8  Only those operating farms with annual sales greater than $10,000 are used in the calculation of the WORK variable.
9  LTINT and STINT are both nominal interest rates.
10  The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB) classifies a bank as agricultural if its ratio of farm loans to total loans exceeds the unweighted
average of the ratio at all banks on June 30 of each year (USDA/ERS, 2000).  This is the definition used in this study instead of the definition in Fultz.
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outstanding on guaranteed loans is a good measure of the cur-
rent level of exposure FSA has to possible loss claims.11  The
dollar amount of principal outstanding on FO loans divided by
the number of FO loans with outstanding principal (AVGFO) is
defined to measure the average amount of FO loan principal
subject to loss claim payment in a given fiscal year.  The aver-
age dollar amount of OL loan principal outstanding subject to
loss claim payments is measured by AVGOL.  AVGOL is cal-
culated as the dollar amount of principal outstanding on OL
loans divided by the number of OL loans with outstanding prin-
cipal.  AVGFO is included in the FO loss claim rate model,
while AVGOL is included in the OL loss claim rate model.  Both
variables are expected to carry positive signs.
The amount of interest rate assistance paid per guaranteed
OL loan outstanding (OLIRA) measures the variation in loss
claim rates due to subsidizing the interest rates on guaranteed
OL loans.12  The amount of interest rate assistance provided for
guaranteed loans is thought to facilitate the payment of loan
principal by lowering the total interest cost of the loan, but higher
amounts of interest rate assistance may foreshadow larger loss
claim ratios since loans are being made to borrowers who merit
interest rate assistance.  Determining the sign of OLIRA is an
empirical matter, since we can theoretically justify positive or
negative signs.13
The proportion of total agricultural debt supported by guar-
anteed loans or the share of FSA guaranteed loans in the agri-
cultural credit market is another variable hypothesized to be
important in determining loss claim rates.  Two variables, pro-
portion of FO guaranteed loans in the agricultural real estate
debt market (FOGLTL) and proportion of OL guaranteed loans
in the agricultural non-real estate debt market (OLGLTL), are
defined to measure the variability in FO and OL loss claim rates
due to increases in debt market share.  Increases in FSA guar-
antee proportions likely indicate increasing numbers of finan-
cially stressed farm operators, indicating  positive signs on these
variables.
One final FSA program variable, the proportion of OL guar-
anteed obligations made by commercial banks as opposed to
other eligible guaranteed lenders such as FCS, mortgage loan
companies or insurance companies (OLBKPCT), is included in
the OL model to measure variation in OL rates due to type of
lender.14  The sign on this variable is difficult to hypothesize a
priori.  If commercial banks have a lower risk tolerance and
therefore use guarantees more frequently, a negative sign would
be expected and vice versa if banks are more risk tolerant than
other lenders.
Variable Construction and Data Sources
The units of observation in this study are states on an an-
nual basis.  The sample period used to estimate the FO model
begins in fiscal year 1990 and ends in fiscal year 1997.  The
sample period for the OL model is from fiscal 1992 through
fiscal 1997.15   The data consist of 320 observations over the
eight years in the FO model and 240 observations over the six
years in the OL model.  The years in this study are FSA fiscal
years which end on September 30 of each year.  Several of the
independent variables are computed on a calendar year basis.16
However, the dependent variables, FONLC and OLNLC, are
computed on a fiscal year basis.  Since the calendar year in-
cludes one quarter (the fourth) that is not included in the cur-
rent fiscal year, all calendar year variables are lagged one year
in order to avoid having the future explain the present.
The data used in this study were obtained from the follow-
ing sources:  Farm Service Agency offices in Kansas City and
Washington D.C., Economic Research Service (ERS), Bureau
of the Census, National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS)
and Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s Report of Bank Condi-
tion and Income Database.  Specific details are given in Fultz.
All dollar figures used in the study were deflated using chain
type price indexes for gross domestic product reported in The
Economic Report of the President with 1992 as the base year.
Although the FSA data are reported on a fiscal year basis, they
are deflated using the calendar year gross domestic product
deflator.
Estimation Procedures
Both the FO and OL models are first estimated with the
complete set of relevant independent variables in addition to
regional/state shifters.  To reduce the number of independent
variables in the models, all variables with a t-ratio less than one
are deleted, and the models are re-estimated.17  This procedure
is used to give a more parsimonious parameterization.  The pa-
rameter estimates of both the FO and OL models are presented
in the next sections.
Due to the large proportion of FO observations taking on a
value of zero in the sample (35 percent), Tobit models are esti-
11  Unfortunately, principal outstanding is not the contingent liability for FSA.  An attempt was made to obtain such data, but the record keeping system does not record
such variables on a yearly basis by state.  On an annual basis for the U.S. as a whole, the contingent liability and principal outstanding are highly correlated (see Fultz).
12   In this study interest rate assistance for FO loans is ignored.  While the legal authority to make such loans exists, such payments were only made for a short period and
are not a part of current lending practices.
13   The data for FSA interest rate assistance are limited to fiscal years 1992 through 1998.  Although interest rate assistance was available for guaranteed loans prior to
fiscal 1992, observations for those years were unavailable.
14    Unfortunately, only data for this variable were available for fiscal years 1992 through 1998.  Thus inclusion of these data into the models limits the sample size by two
years.  Preliminary estimation indicated that inclusion of these data into the OL model significantly affected results, while inclusion of a similar variable into the FO
model was insignificant.
15    While considerable descriptive analysis is presented for the FSA variables for the period 1989 to 1998, the time frame of the regression models is limited to 1990 to
1997 for FO loans and 1992 to 1997 for OL loans.  This is due to constraints in the availability of observations on the independent variables for certain years included
in the study.
16  Independent variables reported on a calendar year basis include DAR, NFI, ROA, DEBTSVC, CREV, SIZE, WORK, GOV, AGBNK, FOGLTL and OLGLTL.
Independent variables reported on a fiscal year basis include LTINT, STINT, AGTL, LAR, AVGFO, AVGOL, OLIRA and OLBKPCT.
17  The initial results of both models are found in the Appendix.  None of the coefficients in the reduced model change sign from the models with all hypothesized variables.
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mated.  Although preliminary OLS estimation indicated that
including regions as the fixed effects groups is less desirable
than state fixed effects, the LIMDEP algorithm would not con-
verge with all 40 state binary variables included.  Therefore,
regional fixed effects are used instead.
Unfortunately, software to estimate the presence of
autocorrelation (error terms that are serially correlated) in a
model most appropriately estimated by a Tobit estimator is not
available.  As an approximate test for the presence of
autocorrelation, the full FO model is estimated as a fixed ef-
fects model by OLS including all the hypothesized regressors.
The estimate of the first order correlation coefficient, assuming
it is the same for each state, gave a value of 0.0196.  Because
this magnitude is so slight, it is assumed in further estimation
of the FO model that the error terms were non-autocorrelated.18
As discussed previously, a Harvey multiplicative Tobit model
is specified to provide asymptotically efficient coefficient and
standard error estimates in the FO model where the error term
variances are allowed to vary by region.19  Seven of the nine
regional terms are significant at the 0.05 level for the final FO model.
For the OL loans, a time series/cross sectional (TSCS)
model is specified and estimated using FGLS.  A Tobit frame-
work is not employed for the OL model because relatively few
of the observations for OLNLC are zeros (5 percent).  The co-
efficient vector is assumed to be constant over time except for
the intercept.  State binary variables are included to represent
fixed effects.  As with the FO model, a check was made for the
presence of autocorrelation.  The first order autocorrelation es-
timate from the OLS fixed effects model for OL loans includ-
ing all the hypothesized regressors was -0.0739 indicating that
autocorrelation is not an important factor.  Thus, in the subse-
quent OL model, the error terms are assumed to be non-
autocorrelated.20  A likelihood ratio test for constant error term
variances across states  is rejected at the 0.05 level, so the sub-
sequent OL model is estimated assuming no variation in error




The estimated coefficients of the continuous independent
variables in the final FO model are displayed in Table 6.21  The
variables debt servicing ratio (DEBTSVC) and proportion of
real estate debt supported by FO guarantees (FOGLTL) are
omitted from the model after initial estimation because their t-
ratios are less than one in absolute value.  Of the twelve ex-
18  The final models are also estimated using OLS to derive first order correlation coefficient estimates.  The estimate for the FO model is 0.0191.
19  The Harvey multiplicative heteroscedasticity model in LIMDEP (Greene, 1998) is used.
20  As with the FO model, the final OL regression model is re-estimated using OLS to derive a final autocorrelation estimate.  The estimate is -0.0677.
21   See Appendix A for the initial FO model that includes all the hypothesized regressors.  The variables DEBTSVC and FOGLTL are negligibly correlated with each
other nor do they have a correlation coefficient with FONLC greater than .05 in absolute value.
Table 6.  Tobit Coefficients for Farm Ownership Loan Model
Variablea Coefficient Standard Error /Std Error Elasticity†
DAR 0.058* 0.026 2.217 1.732
NFI 0.193* 0.083 2.324 0.792
ROA -0.735E-03* 0.298E-03 -2.471 -0.441
CREV 0.008* 0.004 2.130 0.679
SIZE -0.002 0.001 -1.439 -0.292
WORK -0.025 0.015 -1.672 -1.118
LTINT 0.149* 0.043 3.429 2.761
GOV 0.272 0.238 1.141 0.218
AGTL -0.022* 0.009 -2.455 -0.282
AGBNK -1.293* 0.488 -2.650 -0.368
LAR -0.035* 0.009 -3.820 -3.979
AVGFO -0.042 0.029 -1.448 -1.192
a The variable names and units are defined in Table 5.
† The elasticities for the continuous variables retained in the FO model were computed using the coefficients adjusted for truncation in the TOBIT
model (Greene, 1998), the sample means of the independent variables and the expected value of the dependent variable evaluated at the sample
means of the independent variables (Thraen, Hammond and Buxton).  R2 for the OLS estimate of this model is 0.201.
* Significantly different from zero based on a two-sided test at the 0.05 level.
Source: Computed.
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planatory variables in the final FO model, seven variables—
debt-to-asset ratio (DAR), rate of return on assets (ROA), net
farm income (NFI), crop revenue (CREV), long-term interest
rates (LTINT), commercial bank loan-to-asset ratio (LAR), and
average FO principal outstanding (AVGFO)—are hypothesized
to have specific signs.  Of those seven variables, DAR, ROA,
CREV, and LTINT have the coefficient signs expected and are
significantly different from zero.  The sign on NFI is unexpect-
edly positive and LAR is unexpectedly negative, and both are
significant at the 0.05 level.  Of the five variables in the FO
model with no a priori signs, two commercial bank variables–
agricultural loans-to-total loans ratio (AGTL) and agricultural
banks per farm (AGBNK)—are significant at the 0.05 level and
have negative signs.  The other three variables–off-farm income
(WORK), government payments (GOV) and average farm size
(SIZE)–are not significant at the 0.05 level.
The positive sign on the debt-to-asset ratio (DAR) indi-
cates that as farmers in the state have a greater amount of debt
relative to assets, the ratio of FO loss claims to outstanding prin-
cipal increases.  This is expected because a decrease in sol-
vency implies more financial risk.  The negative sign on return
on assets (ROA) indicates that as farming becomes more effi-
cient, loss claim rates decline.
The coefficient for net farm income (NFI) is unexpectedly
positive meaning that loss claim rates increase at higher levels
of net farm income.  Although this relationship is counter-intui-
tive, it does seem plausible given that the data typically show
higher loss claim rates following years of higher net farm in-
come.  One possible explanation could be that farmers suffer-
ing due to low net farm income in a given year may have been
able to obtain enough credit to enable them to continue their
business hoping that future income increases would compen-
sate for the bad year.  Then, perhaps, the subsequent increases
in net farm income were not sufficient to enable those farmers
already on the brink of financial failure to service their debt.
Thus, though net farm income increased, loss claim rates in-
creased as well.  Alternatively, if fewer loans are guaranteed in
high net farm income years, then loss claim payments may not
change enough to effect the decrease in the denominator of
FONLC.
The positive and significant sign on the share of farm rev-
enues from crops (CREV) confirms the hypothesis that an in-
crease in revenues from crops–a riskier enterprise–leads to
higher loss claim rates.  The positive sign on CREV may indi-
cate that as a state has a higher proportion of revenues coming
from crops, crop farmers using FO guarantees are forced into
default when crop prices are low or there is drought (assuming
that most of the variability of CREV is due to diversity of enter-
prise and not price or output fluctuations).  Since relatively few
loans are defaulted in any year, a modest increase in the abso-
lute number of crop farmers defaulting on FO loans explains
the positive sign.
The negative coefficient on off-farm income (WORK) in-
dicates that as the proportion of farm operators working off the
farm more than 200 days per year increases, FO loss claim rates
decrease.  This might be explained by farm operators reducing
financial risk by supplementing farm income with off-farm
sources of income.  However, the coefficient for this variable is
not significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level.  Not sur-
prisingly, the interest rate charged on long-term real estate loans
(LTINT) is positively signed indicating that increased costs of
debt result in higher loss claim rates.  Even if FO loans have a
fixed interest rates (this can vary) generally rising rates stress
overall farm operations.
All three commercial bank variables–agricultural loans-to-
total loans ratio (AGTL), loan-to-asset ratio (LAR) and avail-
ability of agricultural banks (AGBNK)–were negatively and
significantly related to FO loss claim rates.  The significance of
AGTL and AGBNK support the notion that agricultural lenders
are more sensitive to farm economy fluctuations that may ad-
versely affect their borrowers’ financial performances.  Such
lenders are able to select borrowers and adjust loan terms ac-
cordingly, and perhaps, guarantee proportionately more loans.
This increased sensitivity on the part of agriculturally oriented
commercial banks to agricultural borrowers results in a decrease
in FO loss claim rates.  The significance of AGTL and AGBNK
also emphasizes the role played by lenders with agricultural
expertise.  As more agricultural banks get merged into larger
banks and lose their agricultural interest (Ahrendsen, Dixon and
Lee), FO loss claim rates might increase, implying a higher cost
per dollar borrowed to the FSA guaranteed loan program.
The negative sign and significance of the loan-to-asset ra-
tio (LAR) for the banking industry are intriguing.  Dixon,
Ahrendsen, and McCollum found increasing loan-to-asset ra-
tios associated with increased guarantee use.  Our data show
that states with higher loan-to-asset ratios tend to be states domi-
nated by larger banks.22  If larger banks are less aggressive ag-
ricultural lenders, they may be more likely to require an FSA
guarantee even though these loans carry a modest credit risk.
An FSA guarantee would enable such banks to reduce their lend-
ing risk exposure and capital needs because the guaranteed por-
tion of the loan carries a lower risk rating (Koenig and Dodson).
This is important since larger banks tend to have higher loan-
to-asset ratios which means that a higher percentage of the bank’s
assets may be subject to more default risk.  These larger banks
also would be expected to require an FSA guarantee when lend-
ing to farms of modest risk because they tend to use the Small
Business Administration loan guarantee programs when serv-
ing small businesses of modest risk.  The results imply that such
behavior by banks would reduce FO loss claim rates.
In order to compare the effects of these variables on FO
loss claim rates (FONLC) without accounting for differences
in units among the variables, elasticities were computed.  The
elasticities for all continuous variables in the FO model are listed
22   One problem with the definition of the loan-to-asset variable is that it is calculated with data at the commercial bank level.  Although commercial banks may have
branches in several different states, the data for all branches are reported in the state where the bank is headquartered so that the loan-to-asset ratio is computed
at the bank level.   This becomes more of a problem for the later years in the sample, i.e., 1997, when there was an increase in branching by banks across state
lines.
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in Table 6.  The elasticities of these variables computed at the
sample means vary from -3.98 for loan-to-asset ratio to 2.76 for
long-term interest rate.  Five of the eight variables significant at
the 0.05 level–return on assets, net farm income, crop revenue,
agricultural loans-to-total loans ratio, and availability of agri-
cultural banks–are in the inelastic range.  However, the other
three variables significant at the 0.05 level–debt-to-asset ratio,
long-term interest rate, and loan-to-asset ratio–are elastic.  Thus,
proportionate variations in these variables have the greatest
impact on the variation of the ratio of loss claims paid to out-
standing principal for FO loans.23
The elasticity of 1.73 for debt-to-asset ratio indicates that
loss claim payments are quite sensitive to farm operators’ debt
burdens.  In the 1980s when many highly leveraged farmers
experienced financial difficulties, farm loan losses soared, es-
pecially for FSA loan programs (USDA/ERS,1998).  A future
rise in farm debt burdens similar to the 1980s would likely stimu-
late higher levels of guaranteed loss claim rates.
The long-term interest rate variable is important in explain-
ing loss claim rates as well.  An increase in the cost of credit to
farm operators for farm real estate could result in a surge of FO
loss claim activity, especially since a large share of FO debt is
priced with variable rates.  The large negative elasticity for the
loan-to-asset ratio suggests that aggressive lending policies of
commercial banks can actually lead to decreases in loss claim
rates as lenders expand their loan portfolio and seek to limit
their overall risk exposure by seeking guarantees on agricul-
tural loans that may have only modest risk.
In order to test the prediction accuracy of the FO model,
the observations on the independent variables for 1998 were
used to forecast the loss claim rates for fiscal 1998.  These rates
were then multiplied by the principal outstanding figures for
fiscal 1997 (beginning fiscal 1998) to calculate the dollar amount
of predicted loss claims for fiscal 1998.  Summing across the
40 states in the sample, the actual volume of loss claims was
$6.9 million, while the predicted volume of loss claims is $14.2
million.  Obviously, there is quite a difference in these two fig-
ures.  However, while not desirable, the differential is some-
what expected for two reasons.  First, several of the states in
1998 did not have any loss claims, but given the observations
of the independent variables for those states, the model still pre-
dicts a positive loss rate.  Second, instead of using the more
desirable state binary variables for the fixed effects in the re-
gression models, we compensate for the estimation software’s
inability to converge by using regional binary variables.  Given
these two reasons, the predicted levels for FO loss claims are
about double the actual levels.24
Estimated OL Model
The regression statistics for the continuous explanatory
variables retained in the final operating loan model are presented
in Table 7.25  The variables debt-to-asset ratio (DAR), crop rev-
enue (CREV), average farm size (SIZE), government payments
(GOV), agricultural loans-to-total loans ratio (AGTL) and av-
erage OL principal outstanding (AVGOL) are omitted from the
model due to the insignificance of their estimated coefficients.
The R-squared for the final model is 0.445, reasonable for cross-
sectional and time series data.
Of the ten explanatory variables in the OL model, six vari-
ables are hypothesized to have specific signs.  Of those six vari-
ables, debt servicing ratio (DEBTSVC) has a positive sign on
its coefficient as expected and is significantly different from
zero at the 0.05 level.  The short-term interest rate (STINT)
coefficient is significant but unexpectedly negative, and both
rate of return on assets (ROA) and net farm income (NFI) are
insignificant with ROA being negative as expected and NFI
being unexpectedly positive.  Loan-to-asset ratio (LAR) and
the ratio of guaranteed OL principal outstanding to total non-
real estate debt (OLGLTL) both have unexpectedly negative
signs but only OLGLTL is significant.  Four variables in the OL
model have no a priori expected signs. Off-farm income
(WORK) and percentage of OL guarantees made by commer-
cial banks (OLBKPCT) are statistically significant with positive
and negative signs, respectively.  The interest rate assistance
variable (OLIRA) is insignificant, and agricultural banks per
farm (AGBNK) is significant at the 0.05 level with a positive
coefficient.
The positive sign on the debt servicing ratio (DEBTSVC)
indicates that as the proportion of annual gross farm income
needed to service debt payments increases, OL loss claim rates
also increase.  This is expected because liquid farm operators
are able to meet principal and interest payments more easily
than less liquid operations.  As in the FO model where debt-to-
asset ratio is significant, the level of farm debt burden is impor-
tant in the OL model as measured by the debt servicing ratio.
The negative sign on short-term interest rate (STINT) is
unexpected since an increase in the cost of short-term capital is
hypothesized to make it more difficult for farmers to service
existing debts and obtain additional temporary credit to offset
cash flow difficulties.  However, if an increase in the rate charged
on short-term capital stifles the demand and eligibility for short-
term loans of marginal borrowers, the overall quality or finan-
cial strength of borrowers in the program would rise.  Addition-
ally, the OL loan program can provide applicants with four per-
centage point reductions in interest rates.  When interest rates
23   Coefficients of variation were calculated for all independent variables to identify those variables that had approximately the largest percentage deviations from
their sample means.  In general, the coefficients of variation for the inelastic significant variables were higher than the coefficients of variation for the elastic
variables.  Thus, the low relative variability of the elastic variables as compared with the inelastic variables over the sample period implies that no one particular
independent variable explained a substantially larger proportion of the dependent variable’s variation than other significant independent variables.
24   When a TSCS model allowing state binaries is used, the prediction is reduced to an error of about 25% indicating state heterogeneity is an important factor.
25   See Appendix B for results of the OL model including all hypothesized regressors.  All the deleted variables have no correlation coefficients greater than .5 with
the other deleted variables except AGTL and GOV which have a .75 correlation coefficient.  Neither of these variables has a correlation coefficient with OLNLC
greater than .1 in absolute value.
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rise, these subsidies might be more effective in improving
cash flow and hence helping minimize defaults.  Rising interest
rates often prompt Congress to grant more authority for these
subsidies.
The positive coefficient on WORK indicates that as the
proportion of farm operators working off the farm more than
200 days per year increases, OL loss claim rates increase.  This
sign favors the hypothesis that financially stressed farm opera-
tors seek to supplement farm income with off-farm sources of
income in order to provide sufficient cash flow.  Also, as a farm
operator concentrates more time on off-farm employment, the
farming operation might suffer due to lack of time spent in
management.  Recall that the coefficient for this variable in the
FO model was insignificant and negative.  Thus, the effect of
the variable appears more pronounced in short-term lending
versus long-term lending.
The availability of agricultural banks (AGBNK) also has a
sign opposite of that exhibited in the FO model.  Its positive
sign in the OL model indicates that as the number of commer-
cial banks with a considerable volume of agricultural lending
increases, the loss claim rates for guaranteed OL loans also in-
crease.  This is consistent with the notion that these agricultural
banks might be competing more for agricultural loans and, in
the process, are taking on a higher risk profile of customers
through use of loan guarantees.  The difference in signs be-
tween the OL and FO models might indicate agricultural banks
are more knowledgeable about long-term farm viability and have
a desire to insure against less predictable short-term fluctua-
tions.    Also, this result may be because non-agricultural banks
are less familiar with evaluating the risks of lending to agricul-
ture and, therefore, err on the side of caution by guaranteeing
loans of moderate risk that do not result in loss claims.
Table 7.  Estimated Coefficients for Operating Loan Model
Variablea Coefficient Standard Error /Std Error Elasticity†
NFI 0.080 0.099 0.803 0.142
ROA -0.467E-03 0.430E-03 -1.086 -0.115
DEBTSVC 0.059* 0.025 2.355 0.734
WORK 0.309* 0.070 4.392 6.310
STINT -0.112* 0.048 -2.338 -0.790
AGBNK 9.021* 2.105 4.286 1.100
LAR -0.016 0.012 -1.310 -0.799
OLIRA -2.304 1.950 -1.182 -0.047
OLGLTL -0.079* 0.032 -2.464 -0.341
OLBKPCT -0.022* 0.004 -5.006 -1.404
a Variable names and units are defined in Table 5.
† Elasticities are computed at the sample means.
* Significantly different from zero based on a two-sided test at the 0.05 level. R2 = 0.445
Source: Computed.
The negative and highly significant coefficients on the share
of total non-real estate debt supported by OL guarantees
(OLGLTL) and the share of OL guarantees made by all com-
mercial banks (OLBKPCT) are interesting.  The results indi-
cate that as FSA’s overall exposure in the non-real estate debt
market increases and as banks continue to make a larger per-
centage of OL guarantees than other lenders (FCS or others),
OL loss claim rates decrease.  An increasing OLGLTL implies
that lenders are more likely to use loan guarantees for a given
borrower risk profile than in other states.  Also, the sign on
OLBKPCT may indicate more risk aversion by banks or better
ability to identify weak credits.  Thus, in a state with a large
proportion of guaranteed OL loans made by banks, loss rates
are lower.
The elasticities for all continuous variables retained in the
OL model are listed in Table 7.   These elasticities computed at
the sample means vary from -1.40 for proportion of guaranteed
OL obligations made by commercial banks to 6.31 for off-farm
income.  Three of the six variables significant at the 0.05 level–
debt servicing ratio, short-term interest rate and guaranteed op-
erating loan principal to total non-real estate debt–are inelastic.
The remaining three significant variables–off-farm income,
availability of agricultural banks, and proportion of guaranteed
OL obligations made by banks–are elastic indicating OL loss
rates are most sensitive to percentage changes in these vari-
ables.  Thus, as the structure of the farm sector changes and the
proportion of farm operators working more than 200 days off
the farm per year increases, guaranteed OL loss rates increase.
Additionally, as the density of agricultural banks increase, OL
loss claims increase for a given principal outstanding.  How-
ever, continued bank mergers in the future could lead to more
agricultural banks losing their agricultural interest and thereby
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lower loss claim ratios.  However, the impact of such mergers
on principal outstanding is also important.  Finally, increasing
the percentage of loan guarantees made by commercial banks
lowers loss claim ratios for the guaranteed OL program.
As in the guaranteed FO model, the out-of-sample obser-
vations for fiscal 1998 are used to predict loss claim rates for
that year.  The rates are then multiplied by the OL principal
outstanding at the beginning of fiscal 1998 to calculate the fore-
casted levels of OL loss claims for fiscal 1998.  Summing OL
loss claims for the 40 states included in the sample, the actual
total loss claim volume is $47.1 million, and the forecasted to-
tal loss claim volume is $45.9 million.  This is exceptionally
good and is a difference of only -2.6 percent.  The OL model’s
prediction accuracy is much better than the FO model.  The
large difference is most likely due to the inclusion of state bi-
nary variables as opposed to regions, emphasizing the impor-
tance of state heterogeneity.
A final aspect of the OL model is the lack of commonality
of significant variables between the OL and FO models.  The
two loan types are different in purpose and term and, as dis-
cussed earlier, are used by different types of agricultural enter-
prises implying that different regions of the country use the two
loan types in varying proportions which could lead to different
responses by lenders.  The overall volume of OL loss claims is
much greater than FO loss claims so substantive differences
between the two models should not be surprising.
Implications of Insignificant Variables
In both the FO and OL models, the policy variable GOV is
insignificant.  The lack of relationship between government
payments and the ratio of loss claims to outstanding principal is
not too surprising.  Figure 9 shows the U.S. figures for govern-
ment payments and guaranteed loss rates for 1989 through 1998.
As shown in this figure, it appears that the relationship between
these variables is indeterminant.  Depending on which years
are considered, the relationship changes.  For example, between
1989 and 1990, when government payments decrease, loss rates
the following year also decrease, but between 1990 and 1991,
when payments decrease, OL loss rates increase.  Indeed, the
heterogeneity in loss claim rates across states and lack of asso-
ciation of GOV to both FONLC and OLNLC supports the con-
jecture that government payments were not particularly effec-
tive in changing loss claim rates during the period of this study.
Clearly government payments are used by some farmers to
service debt.  However, lenders include anticipated government
payments in evaluating borrower creditworthiness so that, at
the margin, government payments are not a factor in loss claim
rates.  While government payments are not directly, statistically
significant in the models, payments likely have indirect impacts.
To the extent substantial changes in payments could alter a num-
ber of the variables (debt-to-asset ratio, net farm income, debt
servicing ratio, and OL interest rate assistance), loss claim rates
would change in accordance to the models.
There is insufficient evidence to reject the hypothesis of
no relationship between interest rate assistance and loss claim
rates.  This does not imply that the interest rate assistance pro-
gram (IRA) is failing to help farmers stay in farming.  Undoubt-
edly some farmers receiving this additional assistance are helped.
The fact that IRA is unassociated with loss claim rates might
indicate that the program is accomplishing its goal of helping
more marginal farmers survive.  That is, with the additional
assistance, such farmers fail at about the same rate as non-as-
sisted farmers, ceteris paribus.  Yet, the insignificance of OLIRA
might also indicate that the levels of assistance provided are
too modest to have an observable impact.
CONCLUSIONS
Annual Farm Service Agency loan guarantee obligations
decreased somewhat through 1997, but rose sharply in the last
two years as commodity prices collapsed and as Congress has
provided greater lending authority because of the perception of
increased loan risk.  Principal outstanding doubled since fiscal
1989, and loss claims have been at their highest levels for the
decade in recent years ($68 million in 1999).  In fiscal 1997,
the mean operating loan loss claim rate for the U.S. reached its
highest level since fiscal 1989 at 1.4 percent, but the mean farm
ownership loan loss claim rate for the U.S. has increased only
slightly in past years.  Although obligation levels did not in-
crease immediately following the enactment of the FAIR Act,
recent changes to the maximum loan limits for both FO and OL
loans make the FSA guaranteed loan program accessible to more
farmers who do not qualify for credit at reasonable rates of in-
terest or terms.
The characteristics that influence the variation in guaran-
teed loss claim rates can be utilized by FSA to predict loss claim
levels as a function of several variables.  Financial characteris-
tics of farm operators–including debt-to-asset ratios, rates of
return on assets, net farm income, and debt servicing ratios–are
important in predicting loss claim rates.  Also, structural char-
acteristics of the farm economy such as percentage of total farm
revenue derived from the sale of crops and the proportion of
farm operators with substantial off-farm work can be used to
predict loss claims.  Interest rates in the farm economy are also
important in determining loss claim rates.  One of the short-
comings of the study is that the sample period does not include
years with a substantial downturn in the farm economy like the
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Fig. 9. Government Payments and FSA Loss Claim Rates
for the U.S., 1989-1998
* Loss claim rates are computed as the sum of losses in the 48 states divided by
the sum of principal for the U.S., not the mean of the 48 rates for a given year.
Sources: Loss claim rates are computed from data provided by Farm Service
Agency, Washington D.C., and government payment figures are from the Eco-
nomic Research Service website.
Fig. 9. Government Payments and FSA Loss Claim Rates*
for the U.S., 1989-1998
25
Models of Farm Service Agency Guaranteed Loan Loss Claim Rates
LITERATURE CITED
Ahrendsen, B. L., B. L. Dixon and L. T. Lee.  “Independent
Commercial Bank Mergers and Agricultural Lending Con-
centration.”  Journal of Agr. and Applied Econ. 31, 2(Au-
gust 1999): 215-227.
Council of Economic Advisors.  Economic Report of the Presi-
dent.  Washington, DC:  United States Government Printing
Office, 1999.
Dixon B. L., B. L. Ahrendsen and S. M. McCollum.  Models of
FSA Guaranteed Loan Use Volume and Loss Claims Among
Arkansas Commercial Banks.  Arkansas Agr. Experiment
Station Research Bulletin 962, Nov. 1999.
Dodson, C. B. and S. R. Koenig.  “How Financially Stressed
Are Current FSA Borrowers?”  In NC-221 Proceedings.
Iowa State University,  (April 1999):186-205.
Fultz, Latisha A.  “Factors Determining FSA Guaranteed Loan
Loss Claim Activity in the U.S. for 1990-1997.”  Unpub-
lished M.S. thesis, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, 1999.
Greene, W. H.  LIMDEP Version 7.0 User’s Manual.  Plainview,
NY: Econometric Software, Inc., 1998.
Judge, G. G. W. E. Griffiths, R. C. Hill and T. C. Lee. The Theory
and Practice of Econometrics.  Second ed. New York: John
Wiley and Sons, 1984.
Koenig, S. R. and C. B. Dodson.  “A Look at FCS Participation
in FSA’s Guaranteed Lending Programs.”  J. of Agricultural
Lending.  11(1998):45-53.
Koenig, S. R. and P. S. Sullivan.  Profile of Participants in
FmHA’s Guaranteed Farm Loan Programs.  Washington,
DC: USDA/ERS, Staff Report No. 9160, Dec. 1991.
Miller, L. H. and E. L. LaDue.  “Credit Assessment Models for
Farm Borrowers:  A Logit Analysis.”  Agr. Fin. Rev.
49(1989):22-36.
Shepard, L. E. and R. A. Collins.  “Why Do Farmers Fail?  Farm
Bankruptcies 1910-78.”  Amer. J. Agr. Econ.  64,
4(1982):609-15.
Thraen, C. S., J. W. Hammond and B. M. Buxton.  “Estimating
Components of Demand Elasticities from Cross-Sectional
Data.”  Amer. J. Agr. Econ.  60, 4(1978):674-677.
Turvey, C. G.  “Credit Scoring for Agricultural Loans: A Re-
view with Applications.”  Agr. Fin. Rev.  51(1991):43-54.
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.
Agricultural Income and Finance: Situation and Outlook
Report.  Pub. No. AIS-68.  Washington, DC: USDA/ERS.
Feb.1998.
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.
Agricultural Income and Finance: Situation and Outlook
Report.  Pub. No. AIS-74.  Washington, DC: USDA/ERS,
Feb.2000.
meted.  Our results might be different in such conditions.  How-
ever, guaranteed loans were not used then to any significant
degree.
The highly significant relationships between the commer-
cial bank characteristics and the loss claims to principal out-
standing ratio imply factors external to agriculture impact loss
claims.  The banking industry has experienced a high level of
mergers and acquisitions during the 1990s.  As a result, banks
may have become more competitive to stay in business.  This
study indicates aggressiveness in lending practices has posi-
tively affected FO guaranteed loss claims. This may be because
commercial banks with a large proportion of their assets in loans
guarantee some loans even though the loans may be of moder-
ate risk.  In the OL model, higher densities of agricultural banks
appear to increase loss rates.  The relationship implies that the
more agricultural banks per farm there are in a state, the greater
the OL loss claim rates. However, if agricultural banks lose their
“agricultural” status due to mergers or loan diversification, OL
loss rates may decline.  Again, this result may be because non-
agricultural banks are less familiar with evaluating the risks of
lending to agriculture and, therefore, err on the side of caution
by guaranteeing loans of moderate risk.  The study finds that in
states where banks make a higher proportion of guaranteed OL
loans, OL loss claim rates are lower.  This suggests different
types of lenders may use guaranteed loans differently.  That is,
nonbank guaranteed lenders may evaluate credit risks
differently.
The results of the study indicate that interest rate assistance
does not affect the across-state variation in the ratio of OL loss
claims to principal outstanding.  So while interest rate assis-
tance allows lenders to charge borrowers lower interest rates,
this subsidy does not appear to alter overall state-level loss claim
rates.  This might indicate that the IRA program is successful in
putting all borrowers with guaranteed loans on a level playing
field.  However, there is considerable variation in loss claim
ratios across states, so reallocating interest rate assistance tar-
geting among states might change this finding.  Even though
interest rate assistance showed little impact on loss claim rates
in this study, it undoubtedly helps a number of farmers stay in
business who would likely fail otherwise–the main purpose of
the assistance program.  Since long-term interest rates were
found to have a significant impact on FO loss claim rates, pro-
viding interest rate assistance on FO loans may be a future policy
option when large increases in long-term interest rates affect
guaranteed FO borrowers.
Government farm payments are found to be insignificant
in explaining the ratio of loss claims to principal outstanding
during the period of the study.  Because government payments
tend to be counter cyclical (offsetting declines in income from
crop sales) and are anticipated in advance, their direct impact
on year-to-year changes in loss claim rates was minimal during
the early and mid-1990s.  If payments suddenly ceased or were
distributed by much different criteria than in the past, both bor-
rowers and lenders would adjust accordingly, and loss claim
rates would undoubtedly reflect some of the impacts of these
changes.
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Appendix A.  Initial FO Model Estimation
Variablea Coefficient Standard Error β/Std Error
DAR 0.061* 0.031 1.986
NFI 0.202* 0.085 2.389
ROA -0.765E-03* 0.366E-03 -2.089
DEBTSVC -0.003 0.025 -0.122
CREV 0.008 0.004 1.889
SIZE -0.001 0.001 -1.290
WORK -0.023 0.018 -1.280
LTINT 0.162* 0.055 2.950
GOV 0.306 0.252 1.216
AGTL -0.024* 0.010 -2.487
AGBNK -1.287* 0.518 -2.482
LAR -0.035* 0.009 -3.807
AVGFO -0.042 0.031 -1.367
FOGLTL 0.021 0.029 0.719
PAC -0.004 0.014 -0.276
MTN 0.009 0.013 0.683
NOPL 0.008 0.013 0.599
SOPL 0.015 0.013 1.151
LAKE 0.008 0.013 0.634
CORN 0.008 0.013 0.621
DELTA 0.008 0.013 0.575
NER 0.001 0.012 0.047
APP 0.007 0.012 0.540
SER 0.007 0.013 0.584
a The variable names and units are defined in Table 5.
* Significantly different from zero based on a two-sided test at the 0.05 level.  R2 for the OLS estimates of this model is 0.204.
Source: Computed.
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Appendix B.  Initial OL Model Estimation
Variablea Coefficient Standard Error β/Std Error
DAR -0.034 0.056 -0.609
NFI 0.120 0.104 1.155
ROA -0.539E-03 0.456E-03 -1.180
DEBTSVC 0.087* 0.034 2.606
CREV -0.001 0.013 -0.109
SIZE -0.003 0.004 -0.782
WORK 0.292* 0.072 4.066
STINT -0.110* 0.050 -2.227
GOV 0.181 0.215 0.841
AGTL -0.024 0.031 -0.795
AGBNK 8.431* 2.136 3.948
LAR -0.013 0.013 -1.053
AVGOL 0.010 0.051 0.200
OLIRA -2.686 1.983 -1.354
OLGLTL -0.077* 0.031 -2.498
OLBKPCT -0.021* 0.004 -4.650
AL -0.061 0.023 -2.729
AR -0.028 0.022 -1.266
CA -0.047 0.021 -2.263
CO -0.033 0.020 -1.655
FL -0.050 0.021 -2.320
GA -0.046 0.022 -2.041
ID -0.019 0.020 -0.967
IL -0.074 0.024 -3.113
IN -0.061 0.023 -2.662
IA -0.056 0.024 -2.338
KS -0.065 0.025 -2.584
KY -0.058 0.024 -2.409
LA 0.003 0.019 0.128
MD -0.040 0.019 -2.146
MA -0.026 0.016 -1.642
MI -0.041 0.020 -2.062
MN -0.045 0.021 -2.162
MS -0.017 0.023 -0.749
MO -0.061 0.022 -2.828
MT -0.014 0.024 -0.570
NE -0.054 0.025 -2.164
NM -0.001 0.028 -0.051
NY -0.017 0.013 -1.264
NC -0.032 0.019 -1.719
ND -0.023 0.023 -0.971
OH -0.066 0.023 -2.821
OK -0.045 0.024 -1.890
OR -0.014 0.020 -0.704
PA -0.023 0.014 -1.615
SC -0.039 0.019 -2.033
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Appendix B.  Initial OL Model Estimation (continued)
Variable* Coefficient Standard Error β/Std Error
SD -0.027 0.020 -1.375
TN -0.054 0.023 -2.304
TX -0.041 0.022 -1.859
UT -0.055 0.021 -2.616
VT -0.003 0.014 -0.220
VA -0.061 0.020 -3.132
WA -0.018 0.019 -0.944
WV -0.053 0.022 -2.448
WI -0.023 0.017 -1.365
WY -0.015 0.032 -0.480
a Variable names and units are defined in Table 5.
* Significantly different from zero based on a two-sided test at the 0.05 level.
Source: Computed.
